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Is psychoanalysis a pseudoscience?  
Reevaluating the doctrine using a multicriteria list 
 
Será a psicanálise uma pseudociência? Reavaliando a doutrina utilizando 
uma lista de multicritérios 
 
¿Es el psicoanálisis una pseudociencia? Reevaluando la doctrina usando 
una lista de criterios múltiples 
 




Introduction: In the past, psychoanalysis was classified as a 
pseudoscience. Karl Popper was one of those who objected to the idea that 
psychoanalysis is a science, using falsifiability. However, falsifiability 
cannot be considered sufficient anymore, since it carries major weaknesses 
and better alternatives to address the issue are available. Objective: This 
article intends to evaluate the scientific status of psychoanalysis 
concerning the demarcation problem. Method: In order to do so, Sven Ove 
Hansson’s criteria was used: It consists of a set of sufficient and necessary 
conditions which is complemented by a multicriteria list that helps 
identifying pseudosciences. It was analyzed how much psychoanalysis fits 
each of Hansson's seven items, besides proposing the addition of an eighth. 
Results: The results showed that psychoanalysis was compatible with all 
eight demarcation of pseudoscience’s items. Conclusion: In the end, the 
conclusion was that even if falsifiability was to be dismissed, the evidence 
suggests that there are still enough reasons to affirm that psychoanalysis 
is a pseudoscience, since it significantly deviates from scientific quality 
standards. 
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Introdução: A psicanálise já foi classificada como pseudociência no 
passado. Karl Popper foi um daqueles que traçou objeções à doutrina 
psicanalítica, usando do critério da falseabilidade. Entretanto, a 
falseabilidade não pode mais ser considerada suficiente para resolver o 
problema, já que implica em dificuldades consideráveis, e melhores 
alternativas para abordar a questão estão disponíveis. Objetivo: Este 
artigo tem por objetivo avaliar o status científico da psicanálise em relação 
ao problema da demarcação. Método: Para fazer isso, o critério de Sven 
Ove Hansson foi utilizado: este consiste em um conjunto de condições 
suficientes e necessárias, que é complementado com uma lista de 
multicritérios que auxiliam a identificar pseudociências. Foi analisado o 
quanto a psicanálise se encaixava em cada um dos sete itens da lista de 
Hansson, além de ser proposta a adição de um oitavo item. Resultados: 
Os resultados mostraram que a psicanálise era compatível com todos os 
oito itens da lista de demarcação de pseudociências. Conclusão: Ao final, 
a conclusão foi de que mesmo que a falseabilidade deva ser descartada, 
as evidências sugerem que ainda temos motivos suficientes para afirmar 
que a psicanálise é uma pseudociência, já que ela se distancia 
significativamente dos padrões de qualidade científicos. 
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RESUMEN:  
Introducción: En el pasado, el psicoanálisis fue clasificado como una 
pseudociencia. Karl Popper fue uno de los que objetó la doctrina 
psicoanalítica usando el criterio de la falsabilidad. Sin embargo, ya no se 
puede considerar la falsabilidad como suficiente para resolver el problema, 
ya que implicaría dificultades considerables y existen mejores alternativas 
para abordar este asunto. Objetivo: Este artículo pretende evaluar el 
estatus científico del psicoanálisis con respecto al problema de 
demarcación. Método: Para ello fue utilizada la propuesta de Sven Ove 
Hansson: ésta consiste en un conjunto de condiciones suficientes y 
necesarias, complementado con una lista multicriterios que ayuda a 
identificar pseudociencias. Se analizó que tanto el psicoanálisis se encaja 
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la adición de un octavo. Resultados: Los resultados mostraron que el 
psicoanálisis es compatible con todos los criterios de demarcación de 
pseudociencia. Conclusión: Al final, se concluyó que aún teniendo que 
descartar la falsabilidad, las evidencias sugieren que hay motivos 
suficientes para afirmar que el psicoanálisis es una pseudociencia, ya que 
ésta se desvía significativamente de los estándares de calidad científica. 
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Laplanche and Pontalis [1] present the definition of psychoanalysis as 
follows: founded by Sigmund Freud, psychoanalysis is a psychotherapeutic 
treatment and an investigation method (upon which psychotherapy rests) 
that has as its object of study the unconscious meaning of human 
productions (words, actions, thoughts, dreams, and others). Besides that, 
psychoanalysis is a conglomerate of psychological and psychopathological 
theories, which has its basis on the experiences that come from the 
psychotherapy and the investigative method. 
One of the most famous authors who objected to the doctrine, more 
specifically by questioning its scientific status, was the philosopher of 
science Karl Popper. About psychoanalysis, Popper [2] argued that 
regardless of any occurrence that is related to human behavior, the 
Freudian psychoanalysis adepts could interpret it in the light of their own 
theory. Even though intuitively, a theory compatible with all kinds of 
predictions and scenarios could sound attractive, that would not be a 
quality for the author; only a theoretical weakness. In his view, a theory 
that applies to the world regardless of the scenario in question does not 
say anything relevant about it, because even if reality were utterly different 
from how it is today, it would still sound as accurate as if it were not. 
To judge a theory that behaves like that, Popper [2] used falsifiability, that 
works as a demarcation criterion for what is scientific and what is not. 
Falsifiability determines that, for a theory to be scientific, there must be a 
possibility that it could be wrong and eventually be refuted by new 
evidence. It is not enough that a theory can explain the world; means to 
check if its explanations are appropriate must exist, and that would only 
be achievable if there were a possibility for the theory to be wrong in at 
least one scenario. For the author, psychoanalysis would be applicable in 
every conceivable circumstance, and there would not be a possibility to 
check if its explanations were really adequate [2 p. 64-65]. So, falsifiability 
is proposed to demarcate science, and psychoanalysis would not fit in the 
category. 
Popper's comments did not go unnoticed, and he was criticized for the way 
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the paranoia example to defend that the theory would be falsifiable. 
Grünbaum argued that, for the Freudian theory, every paranoid had 
repressed sexual desires towards other individuals of the same sex; so, if 
hypothetically a paranoid that did not repress his desires were found, the 
theory would have been falsified, that is, a situation which it could not 
explain existed. About that, Cioffi [4] counterargued that, even if that was 
the case, this topic is peripheral for psychoanalytic theory, and by using it 
as the final argument, it is easy to forget more critical candidates to face 
the Popperian criterion, for example, the sexual etiology of neurosis. The 
paranoia case is insufficient for taking down Popper's criticism, for not 
being part of the major suppositions of the doctrine. 
Besides his psychoanalysis criticisms, Popper's science view in general was 
also objected to. This article has no intention to reach an exhaustion of 
possible counterarguments. However, considering some examples given 
by Newton-Smith [5 p. 44-76]: Popper rejected that inductive reasoning 
(non-deductive predictions or generalizations whose validity does not 
depend on their logical form) should be used in science, defending that it 
should operate with deductive reasoning only (of which the validity or 
invalidity depend exclusively on its logical form), and therefore, confirming 
a theory would be impossible. It is only possible to know that, if the theory 
is falsified, then it is false. However, even if a theory is falsified, if there is 
no better option to explain certain phenomena that could replace it, and 
considering that the first possesses reasonable assertions, it would 
probably not be wise to discard it just because it was falsified. Despite that, 
his conception of science inadvertently requires induction to justify itself, 
what shows a failure in his proposal. These and other difficulties in the 
adoption of falsifiability as a demarcation criterion turn it insufficient, and 




Sven Ove Hansson is a philosopher who had an important impact on the 
debate of the demarcation problem, by creating an alternative proposal: a 
criterion with two conditions that are jointly sufficient and necessary for a 
doctrine to be pseudoscientific [6], and a multicriteria list that helps 
identifying pseudosciences, the latter being based on seven items [7]. It 
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has the advantage of not needing to face the same problems as the 
previous ones faced, like Popper's falsifiability. Before discussing it, it is 
beneficial to understand his way of defining science:  
“Science (in the broad sense) is the practice that provides us with the most 
reliable (i.e., epistemically most warranted) statements that can be made, at the 
time being, on subject matter covered by the community of knowledge disciplines 
(i.e., on nature, ourselves as human beings, our societies, our physical 
constructions, and our thought constructions)” [7, p. 70]. 
It is common to consider that science only entails the natural sciences, and 
that notion excludes linguistics, mathematics, philosophy, history, and 
other humanities from the category. However, as Hansson [7] shows, this 
is not an adequate perspective because both science (in the traditional 
sense) and humanities aim to provide the most reliable statements 
regarding their object of study. Therefore, they can be understood as the 
theories that present the most robust evidence regarding what they 
investigate. Together, they form a community, and the disciplines that are 
part of it cooperate and depend on each other to fulfill this goal. 
A recurrent argument is that psychoanalysis is a science, since it is inserted 
within the academic realm, in research, and in departments of many higher 
education courses. It would therefore be part of the scientific community. 
However, "It is not the academic status but the methodology and the type 
of knowledge that should determine whether a discipline is scientific (in the 
broad sense)" [7 p. 64]. Even if it is recognized by the academy, this does 
not make it a science. If homeopaths or creationists, for example, started 
creating academic courses, published papers about their theories, and 
organized formal congress meetings to assemble their community, that 
would not be the factor for turning homeopathy and creationism into 
sciences; the same is true for other doctrines. 
Hansson [7] also mentions that even in the field of humanities extremely 
dubitable theories are also present; for example, the holocaust deniers and 
the ancient astronaut theorists. To avoid a division between 
pseudohumanities and pseudosciences and accurately acknowledge the 
endeavor that aims to provide us with the most reliable statements that 
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When a statement is supported by a sufficient amount of evidence, it is 
epistemically justified. Sufficient evidence is what makes a belief reliable, 
as it provides good reason to think that the proposed hypothesis is 
probably true. The fact that science is the practice that provides the most 
reliable statements means that it is the one that presents the best and 
most robust evidence regarding its objects of study. Controls and 
adjustments are constantly being made to get closer and closer to an 
adequate description of reality. 
For example, when someone wants to conduct an empirical investigation 
about whether or not some new treatment works, a randomized double-
blind placebo-controlled trial is more reliable than an anecdotal case report, 
as it is more likely to show results that actually reflect reality than the 
anecdote. With the first, there is a systematization of its investigations and 
control of biases, which is absent in the second. In this case, for hypotheses 
that require empirical analysis of that kind, it is more appropriate to use 
the first type of study precisely because it is the one that provides the best 
evidence, and its proper use makes that investigation scientific. On the 
other hand, using methods with low standards of investigative quality, such 
as anecdotal cases, would not be scientific. 
Therefore, for Hansson [7], pseudosciences can also be failed versions of 
sciences within humanities, and not only within sciences in the traditional 
meaning of the word. He defines pseudoscience in the following way: 
“A doctrine is a pseudoscience if and only if it satisfies the following two 
conditions: 
A. It includes at least one statement which (A1) pertains to an issue within the 
domains of science in the broad sense (the criterion of scientific domain), and 
(A2) suffers from such a severe lack of reliability that it cannot at all be trusted 
(the criterion of unreliability). 
B. Its major proponents try to create the impression that it represents the most 
reliable knowledge on its subject matter (the criterion of pretence)” [6 p.49-
50]. 
Hansson tries to distinguish disciplines from doctrines. Not every doctrine 
is pseudoscientific, but every pseudoscience is a doctrine. He defines a 
doctrine using the Oxford English dictionary, as follows: “a set of 
interconnected statements that is ‘taught or laid down as true concerning 
a particular subject or department of knowledge” [6 p. 49]. In a doctrine, 
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methodologies and statements are based on assumptions, and without 
them, there is no doctrine. In some cases, these statements may be well-
founded by evidence, an example being the theory of the evolution of 
species, while in others they may not, such as for psychoanalysis, which 
will be shown in the following sections. 
Similarly as what Hansson argues [6], If its most central ideas were 
removed from the psychoanalytic doctrine, as for example, about the 
existence of a psychodynamic unconscious, there would be no more 
psychoanalysis. The same would happen for the theory of the evolution of 
species: if the statements that living beings undergo natural selection, that 
more adapted individuals are more likely to survive, or their other claims 
were removed from it, then nothing would be left. This is different from a 
discipline: in disciplines, there are no presupposed methodologies or 
statements. Usually, disciplines refer to a field of study. Two examples 
could be psychology (when a specific psychological approach is not 
assumed beforehand), and biology, regarded as "the study of behavior" 
and "the study of life", respectively. 
It is important to notice that psychoanalysts do not need to claim that 
psychoanalysis is a science; certainly, part of the community agrees, while 
the other part disagrees with this statement, but what is explicitly said 
about the scientific status is not relevant at all. If a doctrine behaves as if 
it was a science —   that is, if their proponent’s attitude implies that the 
assertions of the doctrine about the world are the most reliable in regard 
their object of study— regardless if it is explicitly presented as a science or 
not, it is already qualified to be judged by the demarcation criteria.  
Even after this explanation, defining the meaning of science and 
pseudoscience does not show what one should investigate regarding a 
specific doctrine in order to check if it is pseudoscientific. Hansson [7] 
addressed that previous demarcation proposals could not solve the 
problem and suffered a series of criticisms. Then, he proposed an 
alternative: a multicriteria list, constructed as a list of mistakes that can 
be made by pseudoscientific theories, but, unlike a sufficient and necessary 
criterion, it is not exhaustive. That means that a theory or assertion can 
be pseudoscientific even if it does not fit in all of the rules, and there is a 
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as a tool that makes practical doctrine evaluation possible, besides the 
sufficient and necessary definition. It is important to notice that in most 
cases, if at least one of the items from the list matches the evaluated 
theory, then it is probably pseudoscientific. Hansson’s proposal is the 
following:  
“1. Belief in authority: it is contended that some person or persons have a special 
ability to determine what is true or false. Others have to accept their judgments. 
2. Unrepeatable experiments: reliance is put on experiments that cannot be 
repeated by others with the same outcome. 
3. Handpicked examples: handpicked examples are used although they are not 
representative of the general category that the investigation refers to. 
4. Unwillingness to test: a theory is not tested although it is possible to do so. 
5. Disregard of refuting information: observations or experiments that conflict 
with a theory are neglected. 
6. Built-in subterfuge: the testing of a theory is so arranged that the theory can 
only be confirmed, never disconfirmed, by the outcome. 
7. Explanations are abandoned without replacement: tenable explanations are 
given up without being replaced, so that the new theory leaves much more 
unexplained than the previous one” [7, p. 72-73; 8]. 
At the end of the seventh item, for considering it to be insufficient in 
addressing other problems concerning the behavior of certain theoretical 
explanations, the addition of an eighth will be proposed: obscurantism. 
This new demarcation of pseudoscience proposal, supported by the 
multicriteria list, makes it possible to evaluate if psychoanalysis is a 
pseudoscience or not, by analyzing how it relates to each of the items 
described. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Belief in Authority 
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Psychoanalysis is a “testimonial science” [4]; its theoretical concepts rely 
on its major proponents' clinical case interpretations. However, the 
authority argument is not sound if the authors do not have sufficient proof 
about what they say. Freud did not make use of systematic and controlled 
scientific investigations and not even statistics to achieve his conclusions 
[9], making it imperative for the reader that consults the foundations of 
the theory to trust that he possessed both different and special capabilities 
to find out the truth about how human psychology works. However, there 
are no reasons to believe that a human being that resorts only on his 
personal experience and decides not to use scientific tools would have the 
means to formulate the most epistemically warranted psychological theory.  
The other major psychoanalytic authors have also followed Freud's steps. 
For one to believe in Lacan's discourse, for example, it is necessary to first 
take it as true and attribute him an authority role, since the reader has 
neither a way to verify its claims independently, nor the resources to 
explicitly understand its meanings [10]. Besides that, in the founder's case, 
reasons to take his narratives into consideration might not even exist. 
When the topic is psychoanalysis, its proponents' honesty is an important 
aspect to be observed, precisely because the theory is based on their 
authority [4]. If there is no honesty, there should not be any reasons, even 
for those unaware of the problems related to anecdotal evidence, to 
continue adopting their assumptions. 
Dersken [11] demonstrates that Freud frequently used a variety of 
rhetorical strategies to avoid criticism and keep his theory's good 
appearance in front of the public, and he succeeded. The psychoanalyst 
affirmed several times that his theory did not consist of speculation, in an 
attempt to convince his reader that a solid empirical basis supported his 
conclusions, even while having none. To deal with the most severe 
counterarguments, he inverted the speech roles: Freud himself presented 
objections to his own doctrine in the most threatening way possible, and 
by doing so, it sounded like he was aware of the problems and would know 
how to reply to them. What other reason would he have to bring up all the 
criticism without knowing how to defend his theory from it? Even so, at the 
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topic was altered, the burden of proof was inverted, or absolutely no 
answer was given, maintaining the original critiques still untouched.  
Crews [9] argues that during several moments Freud adjusted his 
narratives in order for them to fit in the result he previously aimed to 
achieve, no matter if what he was saying was really true. Many of his 
clinical cases developed in ways that were distinct from what was declared 
by him, went through a biased interpretative process, or did not obtain 
promising results. Anna O. was not someone with hysteria; in fact, she 
suffered from a chemical dependency of substances like morphine and 
chloral hydrate, and all her symptoms could be listed as possible effects of 
these [9, p. 354-360]. Dora, a young victim of sexual harassment, was 
reported as a protagonist of a hysteria case for not desiring to be involved 
with her abuser and feeling repulsed by his advances [9, p. 590-600]. In 
the Little Hans case, a five-year-old, Freud did not hesitate to give him a 
diagnosis even before knowing him personally: his fear of horses was in 
fact a fear of being castrated by his father, since Freud believed he sexually 
desired his mother [9, p. 645]. The Wolf Man was declared as cured by 
Freud; however, he kept being treated by several different analysts for 
decades, not obtaining any results [9, p. 651; 12]. 
Those are just some examples of famous clinical cases, but others suffer 
from the same problem [9]. The success of these kinds of adulterations 
and other rhetorical strategies contributed to the building and widespread 





As discussed earlier, the theoretical concepts in psychoanalysis are 
sustained by Freud and the other major proponents’ clinical case reports, 
who also followed his tradition of producing anecdotal evidence. Until 
today, they maintain their authority over contemporary analysts: 
“André Green, when asked about what was new in psychoanalysis, answered: 
Freud. To this playful, but nonetheless very accurate answer, we could add the 
list of the great thinkers and practitioners of psychoanalysis who were essential 
to the several traditions in which the psychoanalytic movement was divided since 
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the '40s. Decades after their deaths, they continue to be what exists of new, as 
long as we know how to read them” [13, p. 10]. 
Although anecdotal evidence is still being used, in most cases, as the major 
means of psychoanalysis dissemination and production [14], important 
obstacles are placed when they are employed. A psychoanalytical clinical 
case is a type of process that cannot be replicated because it addresses a 
single subject individually. However, as Schmidt [15] argues, replication is 
one of the most central processes within empirical sciences, and sadly not 
even psychology gives proper attention to the matter. It possesses five 
major functions: control sampling errors, by verifying if the results 
obtained happened by chance alone; control internal validity, that is, if the 
procedures adopted were adequate to answer the research’s question; 
control the possibility of scientific fraud; allow a generalization of the 
findings to a larger/different population; and finally, verify if the first 
hypothesis of the experiment was correct. In the case of an unrepeatable 
experiment, the possibility of performing these analyses is thrown away. 
Besides the impossibility of replication, there are other problems, now 
related to human psychology: People are commonly victims of cognitive 
bias that distorts their judgment and leads to irrational interpretations 
more frequently than they usually notice [16], and therapists are not 
immune. An example could be confirmation bias: someone’s initial belief 
significantly impacts how they remember situations and how they interpret 
them, giving more importance to what apparently confirms their world view 
rather than paying attention to what could contradict it. In the case of a 
psychoanalyst, this could bring them to understand exactly what they 
yearned to, that is, what would supposedly confirm the analytic hypothesis, 
regardless if that was or was not the case [14, p. 139-140]. Even if a case 
report is not a good evidence, it would sound like a source of theoretical 
confirmation for an adept, as it is expected that it would reflect their own 
preconceptions.   
As Spence [17] shows, even if someone wished to analyze the veracity of 
the reported clinical phenomena, the person still has to face the fact that 
they are frequently replaced by fictional narrative. Their contents could be 
partially reported, omitted, distorted, and mixed with other case contents, 
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therapist's memory. Psychoanalytical clinical case reports are not 
sufficiently controlled, so when they aim to support a human psychological 
theory, they end up being just fuel for a system of self-confirmations. There 
is no way to generalize a human psychological theory based on anecdotal 
clinical evidence, neither to guarantee its reliability, because a non-
systematized process does not aim to control variables that can interfere 
with the conclusions. At the same time, there are reasons to expect that 




As already discussed in previous sections, the widespread use of anecdotal 
evidence would be an excellent example to fulfill this third criterion, 
precisely because those cases are isolated and exposed to bias. However, 
along with them, another endeavor of contemporary psychoanalysis is 
neuropsychoanalysis. Neuropsychoanalysis is a movement that looks for 
an integration between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, and despite 
being rejected by part of the psychoanalytic community that wants no part 
in it, some others consider it to be a contemporary version of the theory. 
Callegaro [18, p. 207-20] argues that, instead of what the 
neuropsychoanalytical movement declares, the scientific literature shows 
something opposite to union: The evidence from neuroscience either 
refutes or directly conflicts with psychoanalysis. It is not as if it was 
plausible to use psychoanalysis as a reference model; it is in the new 
unconscious model that neuroscientists rely on, and not on the 
psychodynamic one. 
Paris [14, p. 94-99] argues that neuropsychoanalysis is not operating in 
order to evaluate Freudian and neuroscientific theories in an unbiased way, 
but rather starts from the principle of validating Freud's model beforehand, 
even though it showed not to have a consistent hypothesis with modern 
neuroscience. The author lists some reasons that show why 
neuropsychoanalysis is far from science: In this doctrine, it is previously 
assumed that Freud was right, and research would serve the only purpose 
of proving what was already obvious from the psychoanalytic point of view; 
the majority of neuropsychoanalysis papers do not present concrete data, 
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but theoretical speculations; methods used to measure basic 
psychoanalytic concepts are still pretty rudimentary; and, finally, there are 
many difficulties and problems, even in neuroscience itself, to adequately 
locate mental functions in specific brain areas. 
In the end, it is noticeable that neuropsychoanalysis consists in a great 
cherry picking of data, in which its proponents “attempt to systematically 
associate almost every neuroscientific concept or finding with a quote from 
Freud” [19, p. 170], giving the impression that when neurological 
phenomena such as anosognosia, memory problems, brain damage and 
others are associated with concepts from the Freudian model, that would 
mean that they were, from the beginning, an adequate theoretical 
explanation given by its founder, but that is not the case. 
 
Unwillingness to Test 
 
Most psychoanalysts assume as true that human subjectivity is above all 
possible scientific analysis [20-21]. Thus, since the foundation of 
psychoanalysis and until the present day with its contemporary version, 
psychoanalysts carry on the tradition of being resistant to testing their 
hypothesis, whether they are about clinical effectiveness or theoretical 
constructs. Melanie Klein, for example, can be “dismissed (…) from the 
point of view of empirical science (…) while many of Klein’s ideas were 
based on what she called ‘infant observation’, they actually consisted only 
of speculations about what infants might be thinking” [14, p. 55]. Also, 
“there has never been empirical research on any of the constructs that 
Lacan proposed” [14, p. 122], and “neither neo-Freudian models, nor ego 
psychology, nor relational psychoanalysis, nor self-psychology, have ever 
conducted empirical investigations of their theories, or of the process and 
outcome of the treatment approaches derived from these ideas” [14, p. 
55-56]. 
Despite the different opinions in the psychoanalytic community about the 
scientific status of the doctrine, it is possible to observe that the majority 
of adepts have great resistance towards the adoption of systematized tools 
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study, humans, are too singular and unique to be understood by a 
supposed “positivistic science”, in which only empirical experiments are 
allowed [22]. It is explicitly said by psychoanalysts, for example, that they 
believe “that today it is essential to demonstrate that psychoanalysis does 
not need new scientific foundations that would be provided in a 'systematic' 
and 'safe' way” [23, p. 15], that the psychoanalytic cure could not be 
apprehended in terms of efficacy criteria, as would be done in psychiatry 
[24], and that the establishment of criteria for assessing psychotherapeutic 
effectiveness would be considered a threat to subjectivity [20]. There is 
even a clear opposition to those who seek these objectives: 
“What we can perceive in contemporary times, is that many professionals in the 
psi field, when they come across the symptom presented by the individual, seek 
to annihilate it, not taking into account the ethical dimension through which the 
symptom manifests itself. This means that the vast contemporary 
psychotherapeutic proposals that announce to the world a way of treatment 
increasingly supported by science, in addition to the current proposal in the field 
of mental health that plays insistently with the possibility of defining a common 
norm, are not committed to the experience revealed by psychoanalysis (...). We 
will see that psychoanalysis poses itself as an obstacle to this psychological and 
medical attitude” [25, p. 242]. 
As previously seen, using the broad definition of science, disciplines such 
as philosophy, history, linguistics, and other humanities can be considered 
sciences, even without using traditional experimentation, because the 
most adequate methods to look for truth in those particular circumstances 
are being employed. However, psychology and psychiatry are not in the 
same situation: There is no reliable way to acquire the most epistemically 
justified beliefs about human behavior without resorting to systematic 
empirical methodologies. Humans do not have the ability to, using only 
speculation, develop reliable enough beliefs about these topics. Therefore, 
while psychoanalysis rejects those methods, it cannot be the most reliable 
psychological doctrine of our time.   
Instead, some of its adepts are aligning it to relativistic positions. This fuels 
the notion that science is only one more discourse, and it could not claim 
to have better interpretations about reality than any other:  
“The fact remains that science is a discourse. As banal as that statement may 
seem, it implies a dethroning of Science and a reassessment of science as one 
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discourse among many. Freud may be interpreted as translating ‘rationality’ into 
‘rationalization’, and Lacan's discourse theory suggests that there are as many 
different claims to rationality as there are different discourses” [26, p. 138]. 
Science is accused of being the real dogma, and psychoanalysis then 
comes to break it [27]. Therefore, it does not have to bow to its methods, 
including systematic testing [22]. In fact, some aspects of the 
psychanalytic doctrine have the stated purpose of serving “as an 
epistemological obstacle to the attempt of scientifically addressing the 
psyche” (p. 237), and also to the evidence based treatments of mental 
health disorders [25]. Psychoanalysis requires the unreasonable: it 
demands special protection and would not admit being judged like any 
other scientific doctrine should be, while also aims to have a similar status 
that any other would have. However, if the same level of recognition and 
appreciation is demanded, then it must be evaluated by similar 
requirements for rigor and presentation of evidence. 
Despite the majority of the community being averted to hypothesis testing, 
there are some exceptions to this rule. Attachment theory is probably the 
most promising contemporary revision of psychoanalytic theory, for being 
the only one that is more open to the testing of hypothesis and empirical 
research [14, p. 62], and for the same reason it is rejected by other 
psychoanalysts as something that is not legitimately part of the doctrine 
[14, p. 56-57]. Unfortunately, attachment theory does not consider genetic 
and temperamental aspects [14, p. 58], and its predictions between child 
attachment patterns and adulthood are very weak [28], while 
psychoanalysis places the major causes of adult psychopathologies 
precisely in the childhood. 
About psychoanalysis as a treatment: even though there was great 
resistance from the community, some studies on its psychotherapeutic 
efficacy were conducted. Nowadays, long-term psychotherapies usually do 
not have convincing evidence for their effectiveness, and in this category 
long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy is included [14]. One example 
can be observed with the Leichsenring and Rabung meta-analysis [29]. 
Despite being one of the most cited works done to evaluate this kind of 
psychotherapy, it was severely criticized for failing in all the quality criteria 
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psychoanalysts adopt to deal with the lack of good evidence is turning to 
their personal experiences, and this can be observed in the following report 
published by the International Psychoanalytical Association:  
“It is easy to be critical of psychoanalytic studies. There are no definitive studies 
which show psychoanalysis to be unequivocally effective relative to an active 
placebo or an alternative method of treatment. There are no methods available 
that might definitively indicate the existence of a psychoanalytic process. Most 
studies have major limitations which might lead critics of the discipline to discount 
their results. Others have limitations that are so grave that even a sympathetic 
reviewer might be inclined to discount the findings. (...) As psychoanalysts we all 
know that psychoanalysis works. Our own analytic experience is probably 
sufficient in most instances to persuade us of its effectiveness” [31, p. 283]. 
When compared to long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy, the short-
term psychodynamic one has a higher number of studies reported in the 
literature, with mostly favorable results [14]. However, psychotherapy in 
general faces problems with higher complexity than this article can cover. 
The majority of results on the topic, no matter what type of psychotherapy 
is investigated, tend to show positive effects, with few exceptions. 
Although, there is evidence that, in many cases, those results are biased 
or have questionable methodology.  
Dragioti [32] conducted an umbrella review of meta-analyses about 
various types of psychotherapy (including psychodynamic). They realized 
that only 16 of 247 meta-analyses (7%) were capable of providing good 
evidence without bias, and none were from psychodynamic or 
psychoanalytic approaches. Besides the discussion about psychoanalysis's 
scientific status, this is undoubtedly a topic that requires more attention 
from clinical professionals, psychologists and psychiatrists. 
 
Disregard of refuting information 
 
There is evidence that many of the key concepts of psychoanalysis are 
wrong, but notwithstanding, they keep being adopted in Brazilian 
universities and as a theoretical basis for clinical practice. The empirical 
literature did not support the psychoanalytical theory about dreams [33], 
memory or repression [34]. The brain does not work making permanent 
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recordings about situations that are then repressed [14, p. 30]. Despite 
recognizing that unconscious processes exist and significantly impact 
human beings, the psychodynamic unconscious that is governed by 
repressed desires and drives does not receive empirical support [14, p. 29-
30]. As an alternative, the new unconscious theory is more coherent with 
contemporary discoveries in the field of neuroscience [14, p. 29-30; 18]. 
Psychoanalysis ignores other possible variables, like genetics, social class, 
and more, treating a single and specific traumatic event that happened 
during the subject’s childhood as the causation of present disorders. 
However, there is no good evidence of causal links between specific, 
traumatic childhood experiences and disorders in adult life [35]. Other 
stressing events that happen during an individual's life are much more 
impactful than the infancy ones, and social disadvantages could better 
explain the worse mental health outcomes of these groups [35]. There is 
no good evidence that remembering past events would be a good route to 
cure psychopathological symptoms, despite it being the usual route of 
analysis [14, p. 107]. Even with all those disparities between scientific data 
and the analytic view, those concepts are kept alive until the present day.  
 
Built-in subterfuge  
 
This item covers similar aspects to Popper’s criticism. However, it is not 
the same as the falsifiability criterion, since what matters for falsifiability 
is the possibility of a given theory to be proven false. For Popper, there is 
no such thing as “confirmation” by induction. This item proposed by 
Hansson better encompasses theory designs that are always confirming, 
or that can only confirm the original hypothesis, in which alternative 
outcomes are not possible. About the topic, Rillaer [36] provides a group 
of examples of why psychoanalysis cannot be disconfirmed, only 
continuously confirmed. With it, everything could be explained in the light 
of unconscious processes, and finding contrary evidence would be 
inconceivable: 
“Have you forgotten your umbrella in a friend's house? You want to come back 
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himself’, he is resisting to the ‘id’ that talks inside him, ‘without the ego noticing’. 
Does he criticize Freud or Lacan? He is revolting against the Father. (…) Does 
your son fear horses? He fears being castrated by his father because he desires 
his mother. Does your analysis make you suffer more each day? You are finally 
entering the deepest layers of your unconscious. Do the analyst's prices seem 
excessive? You are having a ‘negative transference’ or a ‘regression to the anal-
sadistic stage’. After five years of analysis, do you still feel painful symptoms? 
You have not dug deep enough, you desire to suffer because your superego is 
excessively strong” [36, p. 154]. 
A psychoanalyst could counterargue that this would be a case of wild 
psychoanalysis, and within the clinical context they would not impose 
interpretations, but instead would build them in a unique relationship 
between therapist and client, reserved for the clinical environment [37]. 
However, this does not refute the objection that psychoanalysis is a system 
that operates by those rules. It is not for the depth of the dialogue or the 
time of interaction that it would happen differently.  
Boudry and Buekens [38] argue that psychoanalysis operates similarly to 
a conspiracy theory, in which criticism can always be labeled as derived 
from resistance, and in the case of psychoanalysis, it is an unconscious 
resistance. Not even a critic or patient’s rejection of the analytic 
explanations could be seen as a possible counterexample: It would only be 
a major confirmation that unconscious and unobservable processes are 
happening. Also, if they agree with the offered interpretations, the 
explanation stays the same: It was a process originated from the 
unconscious. In the end, when dealing with the psychodynamic 
unconscious, there is no possibility to accept contrary evidence. In relation 
to psychoanalysis, for all circumstances “interpretation can be a weapon” 
[39, p. 12]. 
Therefore, the excessive number of explanations that would fit all the 
possible cases is not really explicative; it only seems to be. The chosen 
interpretations to deal with the variety of human psychological phenomena 
are not based on good and carefully collected scientific evidence. Instead, 
those are concepts that lack empirical support, used to explain every 
behavior and also its opposite. "Psychoanalysis is indeed irrefutable, 
because it can say everything and its opposite — summoning up the 
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'servile' unconscious testimonial is enough, as it is always ready to bow to 
the circumstances’ demands" [40, p. 140]. 
 
Explanations are abandoned without replacement 
 
The definitions given to the concepts of "cure", "health" and "disease" in 
psychoanalysis fit this criterion. Neves [23] says that the discussion about 
the cure in contemporary psychoanalysis cannot occur if it does not start 
with a critique of the traditional meaning of the term, and the same goes 
for the other two concepts. The author argues that psychoanalysis 
understands that, according to medical point of view, which adopts the 
traditional use of these, a state of health should refer to a harmonious 
state, completely free of diseases and pathologies. In addition, unlike 
medical objectives, Priszkulnik [41] states that "psychoanalysis is opposed 
to the objective of mental health to reintegrate the individual into the social 
community". Still according to Neves [23], psychoanalysts understand that 
in medicine “cure” would mean conforming to an idealized mode of 
operation based on ideas of normality that are socially accepted and 
expected, starting from the elimination of diseases and the 
reestablishment of the previously present health state. Or, more succinctly, 
it would be "the realization of an experience that leads the individual to 
health through the elimination of the disease" [23, p. 33]. 
Considering the traditional definition, psychoanalysis would accuse the 
existence of hidden intentions behind the goal of curing people in distress: 
this would, in reality, be an attempt to exert social control [23, p. 16]. 
Therefore, it would make more sense to be helpless instead of cured, since: 
“We must not forget that being helpless, from both psychoanalytic and political 
points of view, means to a large extent having crossed the ghost of infinite 
protection by the instituted power. To be helpless (...) is to sustain the political 
action as an action that forces the impossible not to cease not writing itself in the 
situation" [23, p. 28]. 
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“We cannot say that the cure, understood as a reduction or disappearance of 
suffering linked to symptoms, is a psychoanalytic concept. We also cannot say it 
is an objective towards which the treatment should aim, or a criterion that allows 
us to evaluate its progress (...) we cannot make cure a concept, or an objective, 
or a criterion, and that is equivalent to not giving in to the influence of the medical 
model, which tends to hypostasize this cure, to give it a status, to elevate it to 
the dignity of a concept (...) there is no psychoanalytic concept of cure, and that 
cannot be a goal that the analyst should pursue in their practice, differently from 
how it happens in medicine” [42, p. 160]. 
Even with these considerations, some proposals for new definitions were 
supposedly made, in order to replace the traditional ones; however, they 
are usually empty and worse than the previous ones. "Health in 
psychoanalysis can only be understood as a normativity that becomes 
individualized, so it is impossible to think of it as the expression of an 
absolute value, that is, of a general norm" [23, p. 28]. It could also be 
added the observation that "it is true that psychoanalysis does not take 
health as a constitutive element of its ethics and cure policy" [43, p. 23]. 
Regarding the definition of disease, we can understand it in psychoanalysis 
as being "a productive experience of indeterminacy" [23, p. 18], while also 
considering that "the disease, whether it be psychic or organic, does not 
mean anything other than the reduction of the tolerance margin for 
changes in the environment" [23, p. 28]. In fact, they affirm that there is 
something special within the field of disease: "being sick is, initially, 
assuming an identity with great performative force" [44, p. 293], and the 
curative ideal "aims to weaken the power that inhabits the experiences of 
the pathological, the abnormal, the inhuman and of helplessness" [23, p. 
21]. 
As for the cure, several options are offered in psychoanalysis. Some of 
them are as follows: "getting cured is, therefore, to build and experience 
a new order, that is, the cure involves experiencing unprecedented ways 
of adjusting to the environment" [23, p. 18]. Or also, “to carry out an 
experiment that is nowhere and cannot be registered in the situation” [23, 
p. 8]. For psychoanalysts, "the cure in psychoanalytic experience can be 
defined, fundamentally, by the idea of transformation, that is, the 
realization of a subjective experience that is not the reestablishment of the 
norm nor the expected result of performing a treatment method" [23, p. 
84]. Dunker and Peron [24, p. 89] argue that the concept of cure can have 
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different interpretations based on Freud's work, in addition to not being 
related to traditional medicine. One of them could be that the "cure 
coincides with the knowledge of the causes of the symptoms" [24, p. 86]. 
In Neves's [23] view, Freud and Lacan's works have as their legacy the 
definition of cure as an experience that touches the impossible [23, p. 25]. 
According to Nasio “the cure is an imaginary value, an opinion, a prejudice, 
a preconception, just as nature, happiness or justice are” [42, p. 160]. Not 
only that, but according to the definitions given in psychoanalysis, "the 
cure as the realization of a singular experience will not be identical to 
anything" [43, p. 24]. In any case, it is important to be aware of the fact 
that even if it is understood in these ways adapted by the doctrine and 
even by Freud himself as a “reorganization of the Ego”, it remains as an 
ideal that is “harmful to the analysis and to the psychoanalyst” [42, p. 
167]: a therapist who seeks the cure of his patient would possibly be under 
the influence of feelings of pride and narcissism [42, p. 168]. 
Psychoanalysis, even though it is treated as a psychotherapy, does not 
have curing as a goal as seen in Lacan’s words, quoted by Nasio: 
"(...) the mechanism (of analysis) is not oriented towards the cure as a purpose. 
I am not saying anything that Freud has not already powerfully formulated: every 
inflection towards the cure as a purpose — making the analysis a pure and simple 
means to a precise end — gives something that would be linked to the shortest 
path which could only falsify the analysis" [42, p. 159]. 
For psychoanalysis, the definition of cure as an experience that leads to 
health must be replaced by an experience that is nowhere, does not 
concern any possible situation, has nothing to do with the objectives 
proposed by a treatment, and is impossible. It would not be identical to 
anything, and if it is not identical to anything, it could not even be identical 
to itself, and that would constitute a logical contradiction. In 
psychoanalysis, the cure is imaginary, and even harmful. In the case of 
health, this would be an individualized normativity that is not included in 
the ethical demands of the doctrine. Meanwhile, attempts to treat illness 
are accused of being attempts at social control, and influenced by 
narcissism and pride. Diseases and pathologies could not, in 
psychoanalysis, be considered as a deviation from the organic standard, 
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instead of suffering. These concepts, in their many variations, are 
supposedly presented as possible replacements for the traditional concepts 
of "cure", "health" and "disease". However, even though the traditional 
definitions can be criticized and have gaps, the definitions adopted in 
psychoanalysis make these concepts much more vague and distant from 
reality than their original versions, with some of them to a point where 
they are no longer comprehensible. This makes the new proposal much 
less explanatory than the traditional one. 
In this situation, there are at least two problems: in addition to having 
explanations (in this case, definitions) abandoned without a good 
replacement, this is a case of obscurantism. Considering this aspect of the 
doctrine, which is not restricted to the definitions of the three concepts 
presented in this section, this may suggest that the seventh criterion in 
Hansson's list may be insufficient to capture other problems related to the 
way in which explanations of a pseudoscientific doctrine are treated. Taking 
this into account, in this article a new item will be proposed, introduced 
with an eighth item to be added to the original list. It could be described 
like this: 
8. Obscurantism: The theoretical concepts or statements of a theory have 
a nonexistent or nebulous meaning to the understanding, which allows the 





A lot could be said about the obscurantism problem, its relations with 
pseudoscience, and its pertinence as a part of a demarcation criteria. 
However, there is not a claim of being exhaustive in this section, despite 
being offered the following explanations for the introduction of this new 
item: 
Obscurantism is a communication style, commonly adopted by 
pseudoscientists as a rhetorical strategy, that happens when the 
presentation of the assertions or concepts in a theory is done in a 
significantly imprecise way, preventing an adequate comprehension of its 
proposal. This protects it from objections: Since its definitions are 
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excessively vague, it is always possible to accuse the critic of not 
comprehending it, as well as alternating the definitions in order to adopt 
or abandon its numerous meanings, using them respectively in the most 
opportune moments. 
An obscurantist text, despite appearing to bring a robust content about a 
topic, in fact does not [10]. This seems relevant especially when comparing 
it to the definition of pseudoscience: Similarly, in the obscurantism case, 
an impression of scientificity is created when in fact there is a considerable 
distance from science (in the broad sense). For that reason, the 
introduction of this item seems justified.  
In some obscurantism cases, a series of claims are made, but in reality, 
they are proclaimed as phrases that lack truth value, that is, phrases that 
cannot be true or false. In others, even if some meaning could be salvaged, 
an unclearness is imposed under their real definition by the own author, 
preventing readers from tracing precise or consensual interpretations 
about what they intended to say. This creates more difficulties for placing 
objections: It is harder to criticize a position that one cannot adequately 
comprehend compared to another that exposes its arguments explicitly 
and clearly. Also, it is important to notice that, under many circumstances, 
concept changes are welcome in science, but in order to do so, reasonable 
justifications must be presented. This is not taken into account by the 
obscurantist.   
In the case of psychoanalysis, some things have changed from Freud's 
times to the present day, but despite not being many, they also were not 
adopted based on the emergence of good evidence. The great 
psychoanalytical theories of the present are still used, adopted and taught 
without going through empirical testing [14], showing that the changes 
were arbitrary and probably aimed just to adapt to each age’s cultural 
climate. An example of this could be the change in the pathological status 
regarding the sexual orientation of gays and lesbians, as well as penis envy 
[4]. A theory supposedly evolving and changing its concepts over time only 
has merits if those changes are made based on good evidence, and not 
only by cultural influence; after all, even religious movements change their 
explanations about the world as the centuries go by, and this is no reason 
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Cioffi [4] points out that the etiological role of sexuality suffered with an 
opportunistic change of meanings. Ideas about sexuality, eroticism, and 
libido had their definitions chosen arbitrarily by Freud according to the 
context: When questioned by the skeptic, they became something that 
would represent fraternal love, affection, or in the case of sexual drives 
they would be desires that could be satisfied by using a variety of senses, 
including non-genital ones. Meanwhile, in safer and more receptive 
environments, those conveniently change back to mean "sexual" in the 
traditional sense. 
“As psychoanalytic theory is entirely empty, it is also, at the same time, 
supremely adaptable. When some concept of the theory shows to be hard to 
sustain, or even downright embarrassing (…) it is enough to silently abandon it 
and take a new theoretical rabbit out of the immense top hat of the unconscious. 
This is what psychoanalysts like to describe as the ‘progress’ of psychoanalysis 
(…). What is given as progress in psychoanalysis is nothing but the ultimate 
interpretation, that is, the most acceptable in a specific institutional, historical or 
cultural context” [40, p. 140-141]. 
Buekens and Boudry [10] show that Lacanian psychoanalysis is another 
example of obscurantism. Lacan assumes that the unconscious is 
structured as a language, and defends that his writings are equivalent to 
the expression of his own unconscious. The adherence to an obscurantist 
style is, therefore, justified from his point of view. In this way, any 
systematic effort to interpret him would be destined to fail, and this 
immunizes the doctrine against any possible criticism. Even if Lacan gave 
the impression of being an authority about human psychology that would 
transmit his ideas through occult means, it would be up to the reader to 
interpret him (in the countless ways of doing so), while still being 
susceptible to possible accusations of not really understanding him. 
Buekens and Boudry [10] argue that since it is not possible to trace 
definitive conclusions about what Lacan really meant to say, the only thing 
left for the reader is to subjectively interpret him according to their 
personal experience, what creates a significant divergence of 
interpretations by the adepts themselves. The psychoanalyst not only used 
an obscurantist language in his works, but also assumed and defended its 
use explicitly: 
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“I would say that it is with a deliberate, if not entirely deliberate, intention that I 
pursue this discourse in such a way as to offer you the opportunity to not quite 
understand. This margin enables you yourselves to say that you think you follow 
me, that is, that you remain in a problematic position, which always leaves the 




This article pointed out that psychoanalysis — not only on its classic, but 
also with its contemporary version — ends up checking all of the seven 
items in Hansson’s multicriteria list. It also fits the eighth item that was 
introduced in this work. So, in this way, psychoanalysis checks eight out 
of eight demarcation of pseudoscience’s items. The evidence presented in 
this article suggests that with both Popper and Hansson’s demarcation 
proposals, and taking into account its traditional and contemporary 
versions, psychoanalysis is indeed a pseudoscience. Even if the impression 
that it represents the most reliable human psychological theory is created 
by its proponents, that is not the case, because it considerably deviates 
from scientific standards of quality.  
Although research in psychoanalysis is widespread in Brazil, its objections 
are not being discussed in the literature, and this may be an indicator of 
alienation [46]. The maintenance of a dogmatic approach on a doctrine 
inserted in the academic environment is dangerous, since it can lead to 
scientific stagnation and prevent the full development of its disciplines, 
which in the case of psychoanalysis are psychology and psychiatry. It is 
important to further discuss criticisms of psychoanalysis, given that it is 
still treated as one of the main theoretical and clinical models for the 
comprehension of human behavior inside the academy. Even from an 
ethical perspective, it is important to carry out practices and build theories 
that are compatible with the best scientific evidence. There is no good 
moral justification for believing in whatever the theory, if it does not have 
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